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11 Introduction
The set of economic situations where network structures play an important role is
wide and varied. For instance, personal contacts play critical roles in obtaining in-
formation about job opportunities.1 Such networks of relationships also underlie the
trade and exchange of goods in non-centralized markets2, the provision of mutual insur-
ance in developing countries3, research andd evelopment andcollusive alliances among
corporations4, andinternational alliances andtrad ing agreements 5; to mention just a
few examples.
Given both the prevalence of situations where networks of relationships play a role,
andtheir importance in d etermining the outcome of the interaction, it is essential to
have theories about both how such networks structures matter andhow they form. To
get a feeling for what kinds of issues arise and why we might be interested, let me brieﬂy
discuss an example. We know from extensive research in both sociology literature and
the labor economics literature that that social connections are the leading source of
information about jobs andultimately many (andin some professions most) jobs are
obtainedthrough personal contacts. 6 The reason that we might care about this is
that the structure of the social network then turns out to be a key determinant of (i)
who gets which jobs, which has implications for social mobility, (ii) how patterns of
unemployment relate to ethnicity, education, geography, and other variables, and for
instance why there might be persistent diﬀerences in employment between races, (iii)
whether or not jobs are being eﬃciently ﬁlled, and (iv) the incentives that individuals
have to educate themselves and to participate in the workforce. Related to all of these
issues are what the impact of these things are on how people “network” or what social
1See, for example, Rees (1966), Granovetter (1973, 1974), Boorman (1975), Montgomery (1991),
Topa (2000), Arrow and Borzekowski (2001), Calvo-Armengol (2000), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2001), and Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2002).
2See, for example, Tesfatsion (1997, 1998), Corominas-Bosch (1999), Weisbuch, Kirman and Her-
reiner (2000), Charness, Corominas-Bosch, and Frechette (2001), Kranton and Minehart (2002), and
Wang and Watts (2002).
3See Fafchamps and Lund (2000) and De Weerdt (2002).
4See Bloch (2001), Belleﬂamme and Bloch (2002), Goyal and Moraga (2001), Goyal and Joshi
(2000), and Billand and Bravard (2002).
5See Goyal and Joshi (2001), Casella and Rauch (2001), and Furusawa and Konishi (2002).
6The introduction in Montgomery (1991) provides a nice and quick overview of some of the studies
on this. Some of the seminal references are Granovetter (1973, 1974), who found that over 50% of
surveyed residents of a Massachusetts town had obtained their jobs through social contacts, and Rees
(1966) who found over 60% in a similar study.
2ties they maintain, andultimately whether the resulting labor markets work eﬃciently,
and how diﬀerent policies (for instance, aﬃrmative action, subsidization of education,
etc.) will impact labor markets andhow they might be best structured . 7 While this
is quite a list of issues to consider, it makes clear why understanding how networks
operate is of importance.
At this point it is useful to crudely divide situations where networks are important
into two diﬀerent categories, to make clear what the scope of this survey will be. In
one category, the network structure is a distribution or service network that is the
choice of a single actor. For instance, the routing of planes by an airline8 falls into this
category, as do many routing, transmission, and distribution network problems. In the
other category of situations where networks are critical, the network structure connects
diﬀerent individuals and the formation of the network depends on the decisions of many
participants. This includes the examples mentioned above of labor markets, political
alliances, andgenerally any social network. It is this secondcategory of network
problems, where the networks connect a number of individuals, that I survey here.
The recent and rapidly growing literature on network formation among individuals
addresses various questions. I concentrate on the following three:
(i) How are such network relationships important in determining the outcome of
economic interaction?
(ii) Which networks are likely to form when individuals have the discretion to choose
their connections?
(iii) How eﬃcient are the networks that form and how does that depend on the way
that the value of a network is allocated among the individuals?
Beyondthe literature surveyedhere, there is a well-establishedandvast literature
in sociology on social networks.9 That literature makes clear the importance of social
networks in many contexts, and provides a detailed look at many issues associated
with social networks, ranging from measuring power and centrality to understanding
the roles of diﬀerent sorts of social ties. While that literature provides a wealth of
knowledge of the workings of network interactions, largely missing from that literature
7See Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2002) for a look at some of these issues.
8See, for instance, Starr and Stinchcombe (1992) and Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1995).
9An excellent and broad introductory text to the social networks literature is Wasserman and Faust
(1994).
3are strategic models of how networks are formed and in particular an understanding
of the relationship between individual incentives overall societal welfare. The develop-
ment of game theoretic reasoning over past decades and its inﬂux into economic models,
has now come together with a realization that network relationships play important
roles in many economic interactions. This has resultedin the birth of a literature that
uses game theoretic reasoning to develop such models of self-organizing network rela-
tionships. This is a rapidly growing literature on a wide-open landscape with numerous
important questions to be addressed and a huge variety of potential applications. As
such, I cannot hope to cover all of the burgeoning literature here. I have the more
modest aim of providing a look at some of the modeling approaches, a feeling for the
tension between individual incentives to form links and societal welfare, and a glimpse
of some of the applications of the developing theories.
2 Deﬁning Network Games
Network relationships come in many shapes andsizes, andso there is no single mod el
which encompasses them all. Here I focus one way of modeling networks that will be
fairly broad and ﬂexible enough to capture a multitude of applications. As we proceed,
I will try to make clear what is being ad mittedandwhat is being ruledout.
Players
N = {1,...,n} is a set of players or individuals who are connected in some network
relationship.
For this survey, I will refer to the individuals as “players” with the idea that they
may be individual people, they may be ﬁrms or other organizations, and they might
even be countries.
These players will be the nodes or vertices in a graph that will describe the network
relationships.
A common aspect to the papers in the literature surveyedhere is that they mod el
situations where each player has discretion in forming his or her links in the network
relationship. These may be people deciding on whom they wish to be friends with,
or contract with, or pass job information to; these may be ﬁrms deciding on which
partnerships to engage in; or these may be countries deciding on which trade or defense
alliances to enter into.
Networks
4Depending on the context the network relationship may take diﬀerent forms. The
simplest form is a non-d irectedgraph, where two players are either connectedor not.
For instance in a network where links represent direct family relationships, the network
is naturally a non-directed network. Two players are either related to each other
or not, but it cannot be that one is relatedto the secondwithout the secondbeing
relatedto the ﬁrst. This is generally true of many social and /or economic relationships,
such as partnerships, friendships, alliances, acquaintances, etc.. This sort of network
will be central to the discussion below. However, there are other situations that are
also discussed below that are modeled as directed networks, where one player may be
connectedto a secondwithout the secondbeing connectedto the ﬁrst. For instance,
a network that keeps track of which authors reference which other authors, or which
web sites have links to which others wouldnaturally be a d irectednetwork.
The distinction between directed and non-directed networks is not a mere techni-
cality. It is fundamental to the analysis as the applications and modeling are quite
diﬀerent. In particular, when links are necessarily reciprocal, then it will generally
be the case that joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain the link. For
instance, in order to form a trading partnership, both partners need to agree. To
maintain a friendship the same is generally true, as is maintaining a business relation-
ship, alliance, etc. In the case of directed networks, one individual may direct a link at
another without the other’s consent. These diﬀerences result in some basic diﬀerences
in the modeling network formation.
Most economic applications fall into the reciprocal link (andmutual consent) frame-
work, and as such non-directed networks will be our central focus. Nevertheless, di-
rectednetworks are also of interest andI will return to d iscuss them brieﬂy at the end
of this survey.
In many situations links might also have some intensity associatedwith them. For
instance, if links represent friendships, some might be stronger than others and this
might have consequences, such as aﬀecting the chance that information passes through
a given link. Much of the literature on network formation to date has been restricted
to the case where links are either present or not, andd o not have intensities associated
with them (for an exception see Calvo-Armengol andJackson (2001)). This makes
representing networks a bit easier, as we can just keep track of which links are present.
While the focus on 0-1 links is restrictive, it is still of signiﬁcant interest for at least
two reasons. First, much of the insight obtainedin this framework is fairly robust, and
so this is a useful starting point. Second, the fact that the value and costs that are
5generated by links may diﬀer across links already allows for substantial heterogeneity
andad mits enough ﬂexibility so that a large number of interesting applications are
captured.
An e t w o r kg is a list of which pairs of players are linkedto each other. A network
is then a list of unordered pairs of players {i,j}.
For any pair of players i and j, {i,j}∈g indicates that i and j are linkedund er
the network g.
For simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i,j},a n ds oij ∈ g indicates that i
and j are linkedund er the network g.
For instance, if N = {1,2,3} then g = {12,23} is the network where there is a link
between players 1 and2, a link between players 2 and3, but no link between players
1a n d3 .
 
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Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. G = {g ⊂ gN} denotes the set of all
possible networks or graphs on N.
The network gN is referredto as the “complete” network.
Another prominent network structure is that of a “star” network, which is a network
where there exists some player i such that every link in the network involves player i.
In this case i is referredto as the center of the star.
A shorthand notation for the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing
network g is g + ij, andfor the network obtainedby d eleting link ij from an existing
network g is g − ij.
For any network g,l e tN(g) be the set of players who have at least one link in the
network g.T h a ti s ,N(g)={i |∃ j s.t.i j∈ g}.
Paths and Components
A path in a network g ∈ G between players i and j is a sequence of players i1,...,i K
such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈{ 1,...,K− 1},w i t hi1 = i and iK = j.
Looking at the path relationships in a network naturally partitions a network into
d iﬀerent connectedsubgraphs that are commonly referredto as components.
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g  ⊂ g, such that
• if i ∈ N(g )a n dj ∈ N(g )w h e r ej  = i, then there exists a path in g  between i
and j,a n d
6• if i ∈ N(g )a n dj/ ∈ N(g ) then there does not exist a path in g between i and j.
Thus, the components of a network are the distinct connected subgraphs of a net-































































✟ ✟ ✟ ✟
The set of components of g is denoted C(g). Note that g = ∪g ∈C(g) g .
Note that under this deﬁnition of component, a completely isolated player who has
no links is not considered a component. If one wants to have a deﬁnition of component
that includes isolated nodes as a special case, then one can consider the partition
induced by the network.
Value Functions
The network structure is the key determinant of the level of productivity or utility
to the society of players involved. For instance, a buyer’s expected utility from trade
may depend on how many sellers that buyer is negotiating with, and how many other
buyers they are connectedto, etc. (as in Corominas-Bosch (1999) andKranton and
Minehart (2002)). Similarly, a network where players have very few acquaintances
with whom they share information will result in diﬀerent employment patterns than
one where players have many such acquaintances (as in Calvo-Armengol andJackson
(2001)).
Methods of keeping track of the overall value generated by a particular network, as
well as how it is allocatedacross players, are through a value function andan allocation
rule. These are the natural extensions of the notions of characteristic function and
imputation rule from cooperative game theory. In cooperative game theory these would
depend just on the set of players involved, while here in the network setting they depend
on the full network structure rather than simply a coalition. In fact, in the special case
where the value generated only depends on connected components rather than network
structure, the value function andallocation rule red uce to a characteristic function (for
a cooperative game in partition function form) andimputation rule.
A value function is a function v : G → I R.
7For simplicity, in what follows I maintain the normalization that v(∅)=0 .
The set of all possible value functions is denoted V.
Note that diﬀerent networks that connect the same players may lead to diﬀerent
values. This makes a value function a much richer object than a characteristic function
usedin cooperative game theory. For instance, a society N = {1,2,3} may have a
diﬀerent value depending on whether it is connected via the network g = {12,23} or
the network gN = {12,23,13}.
The special case where the value function depends only on the groups of players
that are connected, but not how they are connected, corresponds to the communication
networks (or cooperation structures) ﬁrst considered by Myerson (1977) and surveyed
in the chapter by van den Nouweland (2003). To be precise, Myerson started with a
transferable utility cooperative game in characteristic function form, andlayeredon
top of that network structures that ind icatedwhich players couldcommunicate. A
coalition couldonly generate value if its members were connectedvia paths in the
network. But, the particular structure of the network did not matter, as long as the

























Is the Value Necessarily the Same?
The approach surveyedhere follows Jackson andWolinsky (1996), who d eﬁnedthe
value as a function that is allowedto d ependon the speciﬁc network structure. A
special case is where v(g) only depends on the coalitions induced by the component
structure of g, which corresponds to the communication games. In most applications,
however, there may be some cost to links andthus some d iﬀerence in total value across
networks even if they connect the same sets of players, andso this more general and
ﬂexible formulation is more powerful andencompasses more applications.
It is also important to note that the value function can incorporate costs to links
as well as beneﬁts. It allows for quite general ways in which costs andbeneﬁts may
8vary across networks. This means that a value function allows for externalities both
within andacross components of a network.
Network Games
A network game is a pair (N,v)w h e r eN is the set of players and v is a value
function on networks among those players.
This notion of network game might be thought of as the analog of a cooperative
game (rather than a non-cooperative game), as the allocation of values among players is
not speciﬁed. The use of such games will involve both cooperative and non-cooperative
perspectives, as they will be the basis for network formation. The augmenting of a
network game by an allocation rule, which we turn to next, will be what allows one to
model the formation of the network.
Allocation Rules
Beyondknowing how much total value is generatedby a network, it is critical to
keep track of how that value is allocatedor d istributedamong the players in the society.
This is capturedby the concept of an allocation rule.




all v and g.
Note that balance,

i Yi(g,v)=v(g), is made part of this deﬁnition of allocation
rule.
Generally, there will be some natural way in which the value is allocatedin a given
network situation. This might simply be the utility that the players directly receive,
accounting for both the costs andbeneﬁts of maintaining their links, for instance in
a social network. This might also be the result of some bargaining about the terms
of trade, for instance in a network of international trading relationships. Beyond,
the allocations that come naturally with the network, we might also be interestedin
designing the allocation rule; that is, re-allocating value using taxes, subsidies and
other transfers. This might be motivatedin a number of ways, includ ing trying to
aﬀect the incentives of players to form networks, or more simply for fairness reasons.
Regardless of the perspective taken, an allocation rule captures either an allocation
that arises naturally or an allocation of value that is imposed.
It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on both g and v.T h i s
allows an allocation rule to take full account of an player i’s role in the network.
This includes not only what the network conﬁguration is, but also and how the value
9generated depends on the overall network structure. For instance, consider a network
g = {12,23} in a situation where the value generatedis 1 ( v(g) = 1). Player 2’s
allocation might be very diﬀerent depending on what the value of other networks are.
For instance, if v({12,23,13})=0=v({13}), then 2 is essential to the network and
may receive a large allocation. If on the other hand v(g ) = 1 for all networks, then
2’s role is not particularly special. This information can be relevant, especially in
bargaining situations, which is why the allocation rule is allowedto d ependon it. I
return to discuss this in more detail below.
Before moving on, I note two properties of allocation rules that will come up re-
peatedly in what follows.
Component Balance
An allocation rule Y is component balanced if

i∈S Yi(g,v)=v(g(S)) for each
component additive v, g ∈ G and S ∈ Π(g).
Component balance requires that the value of a given component of a network is
allocatedto the members of that component in cases where the value of the component
is independent of how other components are organized. This would tend to arise
naturally. It also is a condition that an intervening planner or government would like
to respect if they wish to avoidsecession by components of the network.
Anonymity
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v ∈ V , g ∈ G, andpermutation of
the set of players π, Yπ(i)(gπ,vπ)=Yi(g,v), where the value function vπ is deﬁned by
vπ(g)=v(gπ−1) for each g ∈ G.
Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changedis the la-
bels of the players andthe value generatedby networks has changedin an exactly
corresponding fashion, then the allocation only change according to the relabeling.
3 Some Examples
In order to ﬁx some ideas and illustrate the above deﬁnitions, I now describe a few
examples of network situations that have been analyzedin the literature.
Example 1 The Connections Model (Jackson andWolinsky (1996))
In this model, links represent social relationships between players; for instance
friendships. These relationships oﬀer beneﬁts in terms of favors, information, etc., and
10also involve some costs. Moreover, players also beneﬁt from indirect relationships. A
“friendof a friend ” also results in some beneﬁts, although of a lesser value than a
“friend,” as do “friends of a friend of a friend” and so forth. The beneﬁt deteriorates
in the “distance” of the relationship. For instance, in the network g = {12,23,34}
player 1 gets a beneﬁt of δ from the direct connection with player 2, an indirect beneﬁt
of δ2 from the indirect connection with player 3, and an indirect beneﬁt of δ3 from
the indirect connection with player 4. For δ<1 this leads to a lower beneﬁt from an
indirect connection than a direct one. Players only pay costs, however, for maintaining
their direct relationships. These payoﬀs and beneﬁts may be relation speciﬁc, and so
are indexed by ij.










where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path (“the geodesic”) between i and
j (setting t(ij)=∞ if there is no path between i and j). The value function in the
connections model of a network g is simply v(g)=

i Yi(g).
The case where there are common δ and c such that δij = δ and cij = c for all i
and j is referredto as the “symmetric connections mod el”.
 
Y1(g)=δ + δ2 − cY 2(g)=2 δ − 2c
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Y3(g)=δ + δ2 − c
Example 2 The Spatial Connections Model [Johnson andGilles (2000)]
An interesting version of the connections model is studied by Johnson and Gilles
(2000). This is a version with spatial costs, where there is a geography to locations
and cij is relatedto d istance. For instance, if players are spacedequally on a line and
i’s location is at the point i, then costs are proportional to |i − j|.
This variation of the connections model introduces natural asymmetries among the
players andyield s interesting variations on the networks that form andthe ones that
are most eﬃcient from society’s perspective.
Example 3 Free-Trade Networks [Furusawa andKonishi (2002)]
11Furusawa and Konishi (2002) consider a model where the players in the network are
countries. A link between two countries is interpretedas a free-trad e agreement which
means that the goods produced in either of the countries can be traded without any
tariﬀ to consumers in the other country. In the absence of a link, goods are traded with
some tariﬀ. A link between two countries has direct eﬀects in the trade between those
t w oc o u n t r i e s ,a st h e r ew i l lb eag r e a t e rﬂ o wo fg o o ds( p o s s i b l yi nb o t hdi r e c t i o n s )i n
the absence of any tariﬀs. There are also indirect eﬀects from links. Countries that
are not directly involved in a link still feel some eﬀects, as the relative prices for goods
importedfrom a country changes as a free-trad e agreement (link) between two other
countries is put into place.
Once demands of the consumers, the production possibilities, and the tariﬀs for
imports from other countries (in the absence of links) are speciﬁedfor each country,
then one can calculate the payoﬀs to each country as a function of the network of free
trade agreements, as well as the total value generated by all countries. Thus, one ends
up with a well-d eﬁnedvalue function andallocation rule, andone can then stud y the
incentives for countries to form free-trade agreements.
Example 4 Market Sharing Agreements [Belleﬂamme andBloch (2002)]
In this model, the n players are ﬁrms who each have a home market for their goods.
Firms are symmetric to start with andso any asymmetries that arise will come from
the network structure that is formed. In this model a link represents an agreement
between two ﬁrms. In the absence of any agreement between ﬁrms i and j,ﬁ r mi will
sell goods on ﬁrm j’s market andvice versa. If ﬁrms i and j form a link, then that
is interpretedas a market sharing agreement where ﬁrm i refrains from selling on j’s
market andvice versa.
The proﬁts that a ﬁrm makes from selling its goods on any market are given by a
function π(nj), which is the proﬁt to a ﬁrm who is selling on market j as a function of
the nj, number of ﬁrms selling on market j. Once π is speciﬁed, then one can calculate
the payoﬀ to each ﬁrm as a function of the network structure in place.
Example 5 Labor Markets [Calvo-Armengol andJackson (2001)]
In this model each worker maintains social ties with some other workers. Over time,
workers randomly lose jobs and new job opportunities randomly arrive. As information
12about a new job comes to a given worker, they might do several things with it. First,
if they are unemployedor the new job opportunity looks more attractive than their
current job, they might take the job themselves (or at least apply andobtain the job
with some probability). Second, in the event that the job does not right for them
personally, they may pass that information on to one or more of their friends; that is,
they might pass the information about the job onto to some of those players to whom
they are linkedin the network. This passing of information lead s to some probabilities
that some of their friends might obtain the job. The model can also allow for the fact
that these friends might further pass the information on, and so forth.
The set of possibilities for how information might be passedthrough the network
can be quite complicated. However, all that really matters in this model is what the
probability is that each player ends up getting a (new) job as a function of what
the current status of all the players in the network are. Once this is speciﬁedone
has a well-deﬁned random (Markov) process, where one can calculate the probability
distribution of any worker’s employment and wage status at any given date given any
information about the state of the network andemployment statuses andwages at
some previous date. The structure of the network and the initial starting state then
provide predictions for the future expected discounted stream of wages of any worker.
With this network of information passing in place, and the predictions it yields for
the stream of wages of workers, one can ask what the incentives of the workers are to
maintain their position in the network versus drop out of the network. One might also
ask what their incentives are to maintain or sever links, etc.
Example 6 The Co-Author Model [Jackson andWolinsky (1996)]
In the co-author model, each player is a researcher who spends time working on
research projects. If two researchers are connected, then they are working on a project
together. Each player has a ﬁxedamount of time to spendon research, andso the
time that researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of
projects, ni, that he is involved in. The synergy between two researchers depends on
how much time they spendtogether, andthis is capturedby a term 1
ninj.H e r e t h e
more projects a researcher is involvedwith, the lower the synergy that is obtainedper
project.












13for ni > 0, and Yi(g)=1i fni =0 .
So the value generatedby any given research project is proportional to the sum of
the time that i puts into the project, the time that j puts into it, anda synergy that
is dependent on an interaction between the time that the two researchers put into the
project.
The total value generatedby all researchers is v(g)=

i Yi(g).
Note that in the co-author model there are no directly modeled costs to links. Costs
come indirectly in terms of diluted synergy in interaction with co-authors.
Example 7 Organizations and Externalities [Currarini (2002)]
While the general model of a network game allows for arbitrary forms of externali-
ties, it is useful to understand how the particular structure of externalities matters in
determining which networks form. We can gain some insight from looking at various
models. For instance, we see positive externalities to other players (not involved in a
new link) when a player forms a new link in the connections model, and we see negative
externalities to other players when a given player forms a new link in the co- author
model. While these allow us to see some eﬀects of diﬀerent sorts of externalities, the
models diﬀer on too many dimensions to be able to disentangle exactly what the impact
of diﬀerent forms of externalities are.
An approach to studying how diﬀerent forms of externalities impact network forma-
tion is to specify a model which has a ﬂexible enough structure so that we can include
positive andnegative externalities as special cases, andyet at the same time we need
the model be specialized enough so we can make pointed predictions. Currarini’s (2002)
model is motivated in this way.
In Currarini’s model, the value of a network depends only on the partition of players
induced by the components of the network. That is, any network partitions the players
into diﬀerent subsets, where two players are in the same subset if and only if there
is some path in the network that includes them both. Currarini denotes by π(g)t h e
partition induced by a network g. The simplifying assumption that he makes is that
the value of a network g depends only on π(g), so we can write v(π(g)).10
The reason that the network structure still plays an important role in Currarini’s
analysis, is that if some group of players change their links, the resulting network (and
thus partition structure that results) depends on how they were connected to start
10To be careful, the v in Currarini’s analysis is a richer object than the value function deﬁned in
this survey as Currarini’s version speciﬁes the value of each component as a function of the partition.
14with. For instance, if player 2 severs all links in the network {12,23} the resulting
partition of players is diﬀerent from what happens when player 2 severs all links in the
network {12,23,13}.
Currarini’s deﬁnition of positive and negative externalities is based on whether
value increases or decreases as the partition of players becomes ﬁner.
Example 8 Unequal Connections [Goyal andJoshi (2002)]
Goyal and Joshi (2002) provide a diﬀerent model of externalities, but one that is
similar to Currarini’s in its spirit of having a specializedenough structure to allow for
pointedpred ictions, but still suﬃcient ﬂexibility to allow for both positive andnegative
externalities.
In the Goyal andJoshi mod el, the allocation to a given player as a function of the
network can be written as
Yi(g)=πi(g) − ni(g)c
where c is a cost, ni is the number of links that i has, and πi is a beneﬁt function. In
particular the beneﬁt function is assumedto take one of two forms. In the “playing
the ﬁeld” version,




where φ is common to all players and g−i is the network with all links to i removed.
Under this assumption, players care only about how many links they have and how
many links all other players have in total. Essentially, players beneﬁt (or suﬀer) from
others’ links in symmetric ways regardless of the particulars of the path structure. The
other version of the model that they consider is the “local spillovers” version, where
there is a function ψ such that
πi(g + ij) − πi(g)=ψ(ni(g),n j(g)).
Here the marginal value of a link depends only on how connected the two players are,
andnot on the particulars of who they are connectedto or other aspects of the network.
Under these assumptions on marginal beneﬁts from links, Goyal and Joshi can then
look at positive andnegative spillovers by consid ering how these functions change with
the ni’s and nj’s. Under diﬀerent possible scenarios, they can compute the networks
that will be formedandsee how these vary with the scenario.
Example 9 A Bilateral Bargaining Model [Corominas-Bosch (1999)]
15Corominas-Bosch (1999) considers a bargaining model where buyers and sellers
bargain over prices for trade. A link is necessary between a buyer and seller for a
transaction to occur, but if an player has several links then there are several possibil-
ities as to whom they might transact with. Thus, the network structure essentially
determines bargaining power of various buyers and sellers.
More speciﬁcally, each seller has a single unit of an indivisible good to sell which
has no value to the seller. Buyers have a valuation of 1 for a single unit of the good. If
a buyer andseller exchange at a price p, then the buyer receives a payoﬀ of 1 − p and
the seller a payoﬀ of p. A link in the network represents the opportunity for a buyer
andseller to bargain andpotentially exchange a good . 11
Corominas-Bosch models bargaining via the following variation on a Rubinstein
bargaining protocol. In the ﬁrst periodsellers simultaneously each call out a price.
A buyer can only select from the prices that she has heardcalledout by the sellers
to whom she is linked. Buyers simultaneously respond by either choosing to accept
some single price oﬀer they received, or to reject all price oﬀers they received. If there
are several sellers who have calledout the same price and /or several buyers who have
acceptedthe same price, andthere is any d iscretion und er the given network connec-
tions as to which trades should occur, then there is a careful protocol for determining
which trades occur (which is essentially designed to maximize the number of eventual
transactions).
At the end of the period, trades are made and buyers and sellers who have traded
are clearedfrom the market. In the next periodthe situation reverses andbuyers
call out prices. These are then either acceptedor rejectedby the sellers connected
to them in the same way as d escribedabove. Each periodthe role of proposer and
responder switches and this process repeats itself indeﬁnitely, until all remaining buyers
andsellers are not linkedto each other. Buyers andsellers are impatient andd iscount
according to a common discount factor 0 <δ<1. So a transaction at price p in period
t is worth δtp to a seller and δt(1 − p) to a buyer.
Given this speciﬁcation andsome speciﬁcation of costs of links, one can calculate
the expectedpayoﬀ to every buyer andseller (the allocation rule) as a function of the
network structure.
11Note that in the Corominas-Bosch framework links can only form between buyers and sellers.
This ﬁts into the setting we are considering here where links can form between any players simply by
having the value function and allocation rule ignore any links except those between buyers and sellers.
16Example 10 A Model of Buyer-Seller Networks [Kranton andMinehart (2002)]
The Kranton andMinehart mod el of buyer-seller networks is similar to the Corominas-
Bosch model described above except that the valuations of the buyers for a good are
random and the determination of prices is made through an auction rather than alter-
nating oﬀers bargaining.
The Kranton and Minehart model is described as follows. Again, each seller has
an indivisible object for sale. Buyers have independently and identically distributed
utilities for the object, denoted ui. Each buyer knows her own valuation, but only the
distribution over other buyers’ valuations, and similarly sellers know only the distribu-
tion of buyers’ valuations.
Again, link patterns represent the potential transactions, however, the transactions
andprices are d eterminedby an auction rather than bargaining. In particular, prices
rise simultaneously across all sellers. Buyers drop out when the price exceeds their
valuation (as they would in an English or ascending oral auction). As buyers drop out,
there emerge sets of sellers for whom the remaining buyers still linkedto those sellers
is no larger than the set of sellers. Those sellers transact with the buyers still linked
to them. The exact matching of whom trades with whom given the link pattern is
done carefully to maximize the number of transactions. Those sellers and buyers are
clearedfrom the market, andthe prices continue to rise among remaining sellers, and
the process repeats itself.
For each link pattern every player has a well-deﬁned expected payoﬀ from the above
described process (from an ex-ante perspective before buyers know their ui’s). ¿From
this expected payoﬀ can be deducted costs of maintaining links to buyers and sellers
to obtain a prediction of net payoﬀs as a function of the network structure, or in other
words the allocation rule.
Example 11 Buyer-Seller Networks with Quality Diﬀerentiated Products [Wang and
Watts (2002)]
The Wang andWatts mod el of buyer-seller networks enriches the above bargaining
models in the following ways. First, sellers have a choice of selling goods of either high
or low quality (which is observable to the buyer). Also, in addition to having links
between buyers andsellers, buyers andsellers may link with each other to form buyers
associations andsellers associations. The ad vantage of forming such associations is
that they inﬂuence the bargaining power andthe eventual prices that emerge. The
17disadvantage is that sales may be rationed among members of an association. For
instance, if a sellers association has an excess number of members relative to the number
of buyers who have linked with it, then the determination of who gets to sell is made
by a randomization. This model brings together issues of how network structure aﬀects
bargaining power andhow collective structures can inﬂuence such power.
The examples above provide an idea of how rich and varied the potential applica-
tions of network models are. This is only a subset of the models in the literature. Let
us now turn to look at the ways in which the formation of networks has been analyzed.
4 Modeling Network Formation
The are many possible approaches modeling network formation. An obvious one is
simply to model it explicitly as a non-cooperative game, and let us start with this
approach as the literature did as well.12
An Extensive Form Game
Aumann andMyerson (1988) were the ﬁrst to mod el network formation explicitly as
a game, andd idso by d escribing an extensive form game for the formation of a network
in the context of cooperative games with communication structures. In their game,
players sequentially propose links which are then acceptedor rejected . The extensive
form begins with an ordering over possibly links. Let this ranking be (i1j1,...,i njn).
The game is such that the pair of players ikjk decide on whether or not to form that
link knowing the decisions of all pairs coming before them, and forecasting the play
that will come after them. A decision to form a link is binding and cannot be undone.
If a pair ikjk decide not to form a link, but some other pair coming after them forms
a link, then ikjk are allowed to reconsider their decision. This feature allows player 1
to make a credible threat to 2 of the form “I will not form a link with 3 if you do not.
But if you do form a link with 3, then I will also do so.”
In terms of its usefulness as an approach to modeling network formation, this game
has some nice features to it. However, the extensive form makes it diﬃcult to analyze
12Another possibility is simply to specify some exogenous rule for adding and deleting links in a
network environment and then to run simulations. That method of studying self-organizing networks is
seen in some of the social networks literature. The idea of studying incentives and explicitly modeling
the strategic aspects of network formation is to try to put more structure and understanding behind
this process, to see which networks form and why.
18beyondvery simple examples andthe ord ering of links can have a non-trivial impact
on which networks emerge. These hurdles have prompted some other approaches.
A Simultaneous Move Game
Myerson (1991) suggests a diﬀerent game for modeling network formation. It is in
a way the simplest one that one couldcome up with, andas such is a natural one.
It can be described as follows. The strategy space of each player is the list of other
players. So the strategy space of i is Si =2 N\{i}. Players (simultaneously) announce
which other players they wish to be connectedto. If s ∈ S1 ×·×Sn is the set of
strategies played, then link ij forms if andonly if both j ∈ si and i ∈ sj.
This game has the advantage of being very simple and pretty directly capturing
the idea of forming links. Unfortunately, it generally has a large multiplicity of Nash
equilibria. For instance, si = ∅ for all i is always a Nash equilibrium, regardless of what
the payoﬀs to various networks are. The idea is that no player suggests any links under
the correct expectation that no players will reciprocate. This is especially unnatural in
situations where links result in some positive payoﬀ. This means that in order to make
use of this game, one must really use some reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
in order to really deal with the fact that it takes two players to form a link, one needs
something beyondreﬁnements like und ominatedNash equilibrium or trembling hand
perfection. One needs to employ concepts such as strong equilibrium or Coalition Proof
Nash Equilibrium. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) discuss such reﬁnements in detail,13
andthe relationship of the equilibria to the concept of Pairwise Stability, which is the
concept that I discuss next.
The fact that mutual consent is needed to form a link is generally a hurdle for trying
use any oﬀ-the-shelf noncooperative game theoretic approach. In whatever game one
speciﬁes for link formation, requiring the consent of two players to form a link means
that either some sort of coalitional equilibrium concept is required, or the game needs
to be an extensive form with a protocol for proposing andaccepting links in some
sequence. Another serious challenge to the oﬀ-the-shelf noncooperative game theoretic
approach is that the game is necessarily adhoc andﬁne d etails of the protocol (e.g.,
the ordering of who proposes links when, whether or not the game has a ﬁnite horizon,
players are impatient, etc.) generally matter.
Pairwise Stability
13See also Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998), and an earlier use of the game in Qin (1996).
See also McBride (2002) for a variation of the game and a solution concept to allow for incomplete
information of players regarding their payoﬀs and structure of the network.
19A diﬀerent approach to modeling network formation is to dispense with the speciﬁcs
of a noncooperative game andto simply mod el a notion of what a stable network is
d irectly. This is the approach that was taken by Jackson andWolinsky (1996) andis
capturedin the following d eﬁnition.
An e t w o r kg is pairwise stable with respect to allocation rule Y andvalue function
v if
(i) for all ij ∈ g, Yi(g,v) ≥ Yi(g − ij,v)a n dYj(g,v) ≥ Yj(g − ij,v), and
(ii) for all ij / ∈ g,i fYi(g + ij,v) >Y i(g,v)t h e nYj(g + ij,v) <Y j(g,v).
The ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition of pairwise stability requires that no player wish to
delete a link that he or she is involved in. Implicitly, any player has the discretion
to unilaterally terminate relationships that they are involvedin. The secondpart of
the deﬁnition requires that if some link is not in the network and one of the involved
players would beneﬁt from adding it, then it must be that the other player would suﬀer
from the addition of the link. Here it is implicit that the consent of both players is
needed for adding a link.14 This seems to be an aspect that is pervasive in applications,
andis thus important to capture in a solution concept.
While pairwise stability is natural andquite easy to work with, there are some
limitations of the concept that deserve discussion.
First, it is a weak notion in that it only considers deviations on a single link at a
time. This is part of what makes it easy to apply. However, if other sorts of deviations
are viable andattractive, then pairwise stability may be too weak a concept. 15 For
instance, it couldbe that an player wouldnot beneﬁt from severing any single link but
wouldbeneﬁt from severing several links simultaneously, andyet the network would
still be pairwise stable. Second, pairwise stability considers only deviations by at
most a pair of players at a time. It might be that some group of players couldall be
made better oﬀ by some more complicated reorganization of their links, which is not
accounted for under pairwise stability. To the extent that larger groups can coordinate
14Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also study another stability concept where side-payments are pos-
sible. That is, one player can pay another (or provide some sort of favors) so that new links form
whenever the total beneﬁt to the two players involved is positive. See that paper for details.
15One can augment pairwise stability by various extra considerations, for instance allowing players
to sever many links at once. For a look at diﬀerent such variations, see for instance, Belleﬂamme and
Bloch (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2001).
20their actions in making changes in a network, a stronger solution concept might be
needed.
In both of these regards, pairwise stability might be thought of as a necessary but
not suﬃcient requirement for a network to be stable over time. Nevertheless, pairwise
stability still turns out to be quite useful andin particular often provid es narrow
predictions about the set of stable networks.
Strong Stability
Alternatives to pairwise stability that allow for larger coalitions than just pairs
of players to deviate were ﬁrst considered by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).16 The
following deﬁnition is in that spirit, and is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland
(2001).
An e t w o r kg  ∈ G is obtainable from g ∈ G via deviations by S if
(i) ij ∈ g  and ij / ∈ g implies ij ⊂ S,a n d
(ii) ij ∈ g and ij / ∈ g  implies ij ∩ S  = ∅.
The above deﬁnition identiﬁes changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the needof consent of any players outsid e of S. (i) requires that any new
links that are added can only be between players in S. This reﬂects the fact that
consent of both players is needed to add a link. (ii) requires that at least one player
of any deleted link be in S. This reﬂects that fact that either player in a link can
unilaterally sever the relationship.
An e t w o r kg is strongly stable with respect to allocation rule Y andvalue function
v if for any S ⊂ N, g  that is obtainable from g via deviations by S,a n di ∈ S such
that Yi(g ,v) >Y i(g,v), there exists j ∈ S such that Yj(g ,v) <Y j(g,v).17
Strong stability provides a powerful reﬁnement of pairwise stability. The concept
of strong stability mainly makes sense in smaller network situations where players
16Core-based notions had been discussed in the exchange network literature, but mainly in terms of
bargaining over value as adapted from the cooperative game theory literature. See Bienenstock and
Bonacich (1997) for an overview.
17The diﬀerence between this deﬁnition of strong stability from Jackson and van den Nouweland
(2000) and that of Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) is as follows. The above deﬁnition allows for a
deviation to be valid if some members are strictly better oﬀ and others are weakly better oﬀ, while
the deﬁnition in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) considers a deviation valid only if all members of
a coalition are strictly better oﬀ. While the diﬀerence is fairly minor, this stronger notion implies
pairwise stability while Dutta and Mutuswami’s (1997) deﬁnition does not.
21have substantial information about the overall structure andpotential payoﬀs andcan
coordinate their actions. Thus, for instance, it might be more applicable to agreements
between ﬁrms in an oligopoly, than modeling friendships in a large society.
Strong stability also faces some high hurdles in terms of existence as it is a very
demanding concept. In fact, one might argue that this is too demanding a concept as
it might be that what appears to be an improving deviation might not be taken if one
starts to forecast how the other players might react. That is an issue that is addressed
in the recently developed notions of “farsighted” network formation, which is discussed
in the Chapter by Frank Page. Nevertheless, when strongly stable networks exist, they
have very nice properties.
Forming a Network and Bargaining
The above mentioned methods of modeling network formation are such that the
network formation process andthe allocation of value among players in a network are
separated. Currarini and Morelli (2000) provide an interesting approach where the
allocation of value among players takes place simultaneously with the link formation,
as players may bargain over their shares of value as they negotiate whether or not to
add a link.18
The game that Currarini andMorelli analyze is d escribedas follows. Players are
ordered exogenously according to a function ρ : N → N. Without loss of generality
assume that this is in the order of their labels, so player 1 moves ﬁrst, then player 2
andso forth. A player i announces the set of players with whom they are willing to
be linked( ai ∈ 2N\{i}), anda payoﬀ d emand di ∈ I R. The outcome of the game is
then as follows. The actions a =( a1,...,a n) determine a network g(a) by requiring
that a link ij is in g(a) if andonly if j ∈ ai and i ∈ aj. However, the network that
is eventually formedis d eterminedby checking which components of g(a) are actually
feasible in terms of the demands submitted. That is, if h ∈ C(g(a)), then h is actually
formedif andonly if

i∈N(h) di ≤ v(h).19 In cases where

i∈N(h) di >v (h), the links
in h are all d eletedandthe players in N(h) are left without any links.
As I discuss below, the simultaneous bargaining over allocations and network for-
mation can make an important diﬀerence in conclusions about the eﬃciency of the
networks that are formed. This means that it is an idea which must be carefully
18See also Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) and Mutuswami and Winter (2000) for similar
approaches.
19To understand these deﬁnitions, it is useful to think of v being component additive, so that

h∈C(g) v(h)=v(g).
22accountedfor. The main d iﬃculty with this approach is the speciﬁcation of the bar-
gaining game, whose ﬁne details (such as how the game ends) can be very important
in determining what networks form and how value is distributed.
Dynamic Models
Beyond the one-time models of network formation, one can also take a dynamic
perspective where networks are formedover time. The ﬁrst such approach was taken
by Watts (1997) in the context of the symmetric connections model (Example 1). She
modeled this as follows. First let me introduce some terminology that will be useful
later and is helpful in discussing Watts’ ideas.
An e t w o r kg  is adjacent t oan e t w o r kg if g  = g + ij or g  = g − ij for some ij.
An e t w o r kg  defeats another network g if either g  = g−ij and Yi(g ,v) >Y i(g ,v),
or if g  = g + ij with Yi(g ,v) ≥ Yi(g ,v)a n dYi(g ,v) ≥ Yi(g ,v)w i t ha tl e a s to n e
inequality holding strictly.
Note that under this terminology, a network is pairwise stable if and only if it is
not defeated by an (adjacent) network.
Watts’ process can then be described as follows. The network begins as an empty
network. At each time t ∈{ 1,2,...} a link is randomly identiﬁed. The current network
is altered if and only if the addition or deletion of the link would defeat the current
network. Thus, players add or delete links through myopic considerations of whether
this wouldincrease their payoﬀs.
Watts says that a network has reacheda stable state if there is some time t after
which no links would ever be added or deleted.
The set of stable states is clearly a subset of the pairwise stable networks.
The following notion from Jackson andWatts (2002a) captures this notion of se-
quences of networks where each network defeats the previous one.
An improving path20 is a sequence of networks {g1,g 2,...,g K} where each network
gk is defeated by the subsequent (adjacent) network gk+1.


































An improving path in this example is the sequence of networks {12,23}, {12},
{12,34}.H e r e{12,23} is defeated by {12}, as 2 beneﬁts by severing the link 23, and
this in turn is defeated by {12,34} as 3 and 4 both beneﬁt by adding the link 34.
A network is pairwise stable if andonly if it has no improving paths emanating
from it. Note that a stable state is any pairwise stable network that can be reachedby
an improving path from the empty network.
A diﬃculty with the idea of a stable state is that in some situations one can get
stuck at the empty network because any single link results in a negative value, even
though it might be that larger networks are valuable. If one can start at any network,
24then any pairwise stable network couldbe reachedby an improving path. But without
specifying the process more fully, it is not clear what the right starting conditions are.
Introducing some stochastics into the picture solves this quite naturally.
Stochastic Dynamic Models
There are two dynamic approaches which can overcome this diﬃculty of getting
stuck at a network. One is to do away with the myopic nature of players choices,
as discussed below. This makes sense in situations where the networks are relatively
small, players know each other andcan make goodpred ictions about future plays. The
other approach is to introduce some randomness in the network formation process,
where links might be added or deleted via some exogenous stimulus or simply by error
or experiment on the part of the players.
This second approach of introducing random perturbations to the formation process
was ﬁrst studied by Jackson and Watts (2002a).21 The setup is described as follows.
Start at some network g.A te a c ht i m et ∈{ 1,2,...} a link ij is randomly identiﬁed.
Just as in the notion of improving path, we check whether the players in question
wouldlike to ad dthe link if it is not in the network or sever the link if it is in the
network. What is new is that the intentions of the players are only carriedout with
probability 1−ε, andwith probability ε>0 the reverse happens. Given these random
perturbations in the process, it will go on forever, andhas a chance of visiting any
network. Some networks are more likely to be visitedthan others, as some can only
be reachedthrough a series of errors, while others are more naturally reachedthrough
the intentions of the players. We can then examine this process to see which networks
have the highest probability of being reached.22
When pairwise stable networks exist, then this analysis of stochastic stability will
select a subset of them. When pairwise stable networks do not exist, the limit of the
above process will involve cycles of networks which are randomly visited over time.
The advantages of these dynamic analyses is that they can select from among the
21This was further studied in the context of the play of non-cooperative games by Jackson and Watts
(2002b), Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2000), and Droste, Gilles, and Johnson (2001). See also Skyrms
and Pemantle (2000) for a reinforcement based evolutionary analysis of games played on networks.
See Goyal (2003) for some discussion of those papers.
22More formally, we end up with a ﬁnite state aperiodic and irreducible Markov process. Techniques
for characterizing the limiting distribution of such processes as ε → 0 are well developed. In particular,
a theorem by Freidlin and Wentzell (1981), as adapted to the study of stochastic stability by Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), is the key tool. Jackson and Watts (2002a) provide
details of the adaptation of this tool to the network setting.
25pairwise stable networks. In the case of stochastic stability, essentially the most robust
or easy to reach networks are selected. The disadvantage with this approach is that
the limit points of the dynamics can be diﬃcult to identify in some applications.23
Farsighted Network Formation
Finally, as alluded to earlier, there is another aspect of network formation that
deserves attention. The above deﬁnitions generally either have some myopic aspect
to them, or some artiﬁcial stopping point (a ﬁnite horizon to the game) which limits
the ability of other players to react. For instance, the adding or severing of one link
might lead to the subsequent addition or severing of another link. Depending on the
context, this might be an important consideration. In large networks it might be that
players have very little ability to forecast how the network might change in reaction
to the addition or deletion of a link. In such situations the myopic solutions are quite
reasonable. However, if players have very goodinformation about how others might
react to changes in the network, then these are things that one wants to allow for either
in the speciﬁcation of the game or in the deﬁnition of the stability concept. Recent
work by Page, Wood ers, andKamat (2002), Watts (2002), andDutta, Ghosal andRay
(2002), and Deroian (2002) address this issue. This is surveyed in the chapter by Page
andKamat (2003) andso I will not d iscuss that here.
The Existence of Stable Networks
The existence of stable networks depends on which of the above approaches one
takes to modeling stability.
In the case where one uses the sequential game of Aumann andMyerson (1988)
or Currarini andMorelli (2000), existence of a (subgame perfect) equilibrium can be
establishedthrough results in the game theoretic literature. 24
When looking at the simultaneous move game of Myerson (1991), existence of a
variety of types of equilibria are easily established, again via standard theorems.
The main challenges arise in coming to grips with the issue of mutual consent
need edto form a link. This occurs either in using a coalition basedsolution concept to
solve Myerson’s game, or when one moves to notions such as pairwise stability, strong
stability, andstable states. Let me turn to what is known about these issues.
23It does depend on the application. See Jackson and Watts (2002a) for more detail and some
examples (such a the bipartite matching problems) where such techniques have sharp predictions.
24The game of Aumann and Myerson is a ﬁnite extensive form game of perfect information, and so
existence follows easily from well-known theorems. Currarini and Morelli have a few more hoops to
jump through as they have inﬁnite action spaces.
26Given the ﬁnite number of possible networks, it then follows that if there does
not exist any pairwise stable network, then there must exist at least one cycle: an
improving path {g1,g 2,...,g K} where g1 = gK. Indeed, there are situations where
there does not exist any pairwise stable network. In such situations each network is
defeated by some adjacent network, and that the improving paths form cycles with no
undefeated networks.
This is demonstrated in the following example from Jackson and Watts (2002a).
Example 12 Exchange Networks – Non-existence of a Pairwise Stable Network
The society consists of n ≥ 4 players who get value from trading goods with each
other. Without going into details (see Jackson and Watts (2002a) for those), the idea
is that players have random endowments and may gain from trading with others. The
more players who are linked, the greater the potential gains from trade, but with a
diminishing return to the number of players added. Moreover, there is an externality
in that the link is costly to the players who are directly involved, but this may beneﬁt
other players through the improvedﬂow of good s through the network. The non-
existence of a pairwise stable network is due to these external eﬀects. Players near the
endof a “line” network of more than two, wish to sever the link to the endplayers
as that link is more costly to maintain than it directly beneﬁts the players involved.
However, once one gets down to separate single links, two such links would like to join
up.













































A cycle in this example is {12,34} is defeated by {12,23,34} which is defeated by
{12,23} which is defeated by {12} which is defeated by {12,34}.
Jackson andWatts (2001) provid e a result characterizing when it is that there are
no cycles andthere exist pairwise stable networks. (Note that if there are no pairwise
stable networks, then there must exist a cycle.)
Y and v exhibit no indiﬀerence if for any two adjacent networks, one defeats the
other.
Proposition 1 Fixv and Y. If there ex ists a function w : G → I R such that [g 
defeats g]i fa n do n l yi f[ w(g ) >w (g) and g  and g are adjacent], then there are no
28cycles. Conversely, if Y and v exhibit no indiﬀerence, then there are no cycles only if
there exists a function w : G → I R such that [g  defeats g]i fa n do n l yi f[ w(g ) >w (g)
and g  and g are adjacent]
The function w has an intuitive relationship to a potential function as deﬁned in
non-cooperative games (see Monderer and Shapley (199?)).
While the above proposition seems diﬃcult to use given that one must ﬁnd some
such w, it has some surprisingly simple applications. One application is to prove
existence of pairwise stable networks under the Myerson value which is a prominent
allocation rule.
The Myerson Value
The Myerson value is an allocation rule that was deﬁned by Myerson (1977), in
the context of cooperative games with communication (aka cooperation) structures,
that is a variation on the Shapley value. This rule was subsequently referredto as
the Myerson value (see Aumann andMyerson (1988)). The Myerson value also has
a corresponding allocation rule in the context of network games as well, as shown by
Jackson andWolinsky (1996). That allocation rule is expressedas follows.
Let
g|S = {ij : ij ∈ g and i ∈ S,j ∈ S}.













The Myerson value follows Shapley Value style calculations andallocates value
basedon those calculations. That is, we can think of build ing up our network by
adding players one by one, and then seeing what value is generated through this process.
Players are allocatedtheir marginal contributions to generating overall value. In this
process there are many diﬀerent orders in which this could be done and the factor on
the right hand side accounts for averaging over all of the diﬀerent orderings through
which we couldcalculate the marginal contributions of players.
The following Proposition is due to Jackson (2003).
Proposition 2 There exists a pairwise stable network relative to Y MV for every v.
Moreover, all improving paths relative to Y MV and under any v emanating from any
29network lead to pairwise stable networks. Thus, there are no cycles under the Myerson
Value allocation rule.
This can be proven a corollary to Proposition 1 by noting that
Y
MV
i (g,v) − Y
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This proposition shows that existence of pairwise stable networks is at least very
well behavedfor some prominent allocation rules. In fact, existence of pairwise stable
networks is also straightforwardfor two other natural rules: egalitarian andcomponent-
wise egalitarian allocation rules.
Egalitarian Rules
The following allocation rules were deﬁned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
The egalitarian allocation rule Y e is deﬁned by Y e
i (g,v)=
v(g)
n . Here simply set
w(g)=
v(g)
n andapply Proposition 1, or alternatively simply note that und er the
egalitarian rule, any eﬃcient network will be pairwise stable.
The component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is deﬁned as follows. For a







For v that is not component additive, Y ce(g,v)=Y e(g,v) for all g;s ot h a tY ce splits the
value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component additive. The component-
wise egalitarian rule is one where the value of each component is split equally among
the members of the component; provided this can be done - that is, within the limits
of component additivity.
Under the component-wise egalitarian rule, one can also always ﬁnd a pairwise
stable network. However, for this rule one cannot apply Proposition 1. Insteadone
must follow other lines of proof. As notedby Jackson (2003), an algorithm for ﬁnd ing
a pairwise stable network is as follows:25 ﬁnda component h that maximizes the payoﬀ
25This is speciﬁed for component additive v’s. For any other v, Y e and Y ce coincide.
30Y ce
i (h,v)o v e ri and h. Next, do the same on the remaining population N \ N(h), and
so on. The collection of resulting components forms the network.26
Now that we have seen some of the methods for modeling network formation, let
us turn to one of the main foci of the literature: the relationship between the stable
networks andthe eﬃcient networks.
5 The Relationship Between Stability and Eﬃciency
Some of the very central questions about network formation concern the conditions
under which the networks which are formed by the players turn out to be eﬃcient from
an overall societal perspective. In order to discuss these issues we need to deﬁne what
we mean by eﬃciency.
An obvious notion of eﬃciency is simply maximizing the overall total value among
all possible networks. This notion was referredto as strong eﬃciency by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), but I will simply refer to it as eﬃciency.
Eﬃciency
An e t w o r kg is eﬃcient relative to v if v(g) ≥ v(g ) for all g  ∈ G.
It is clear that there will always exist at least one eﬃcient network, given that there
are only a ﬁnite set of networks.
Once we begin to deﬁne things relative to a ﬁxed allocation rule, then there is
another natural notion of eﬃciency: the standard notion of Pareto eﬃciency.
Pareto Eﬃciency
An e t w o r kg is Pareto eﬃcient relative to v and Y if there does not exist any g  ∈ G
such that Yi(g ,v) ≥ Yi(g,v) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
To understand the relationship between the two deﬁnitions, note that g is eﬃcient
relative to v if it is Pareto eﬃcient relative to v and Y for all Y .
Thus, eﬃciency is the more natural notion in situations where there is some freedom
to reallocate value through transfers, while Pareto eﬃciency might be more reasonable
in contexts where the allocation rule is ﬁxed(andwe are not able or willing to make
further transfers or to make interpersonal comparisons of utility).
26This follows the same argument as existence of core-stable coalition structures under the weak
top coalition property in Banerjee, Konishi and S¨ onmez (2001). Note, however, that the networks
identiﬁed by this algorithm are not necessarily strongly stable under the deﬁnition used here.
31Beyondthese notions of eﬃciency, one may want to consid er others. For instance it
may be that some reallocation of value is possible, but only under the constraints that
the allocations are balancedon each component. Such constraints leadto the following
deﬁnition of constrained eﬃciency introduced by Jackson (2003).
An e t w o r kg is constrained eﬃcient relative to v if andonly if it is Pareto eﬃcient
relative to v and Y for every component balancedandanonymous Y .
With deﬁnitions of eﬃciency in hand, we can examine the central question of the
relationship between stability andeﬃciency of networks.
I begin with the simple model of the symmetric connections model. While this is
a highly stylized model, it provides a preview of some of the tension between stability
andeﬃciency andgives an id ea of why such a conﬂict might arise.
The following propositions are from Jackson andWolinsky (1996).
Proposition 3 The unique eﬃcient network structure in the symmetric connections
model (Example 1) is
(i) the complete graph gN if c<δ− δ2,
(ii) a star encompassing everyone if δ − δ2 <c<δ+
(N−2)
2 δ2,a n d
(iii) no links if δ +
(N−2)
2 δ2 <c .
The eﬃcient networks take simple andintuitive forms. If link costs are high, then
it does not make sense to form any links, (iii). If link costs are low enough (c<δ−δ2),
then it makes sense to form all links as the cost of adding a link is less then the gain
from shortening any path of length at least two into a path of length one. The more
interesting case arises for intermediate costs of links. Here the only eﬃcient network
structure is a star. To see why, note that a star has the minimal number of links
needed to connect any set of players. Moreover, it is the (unique) network structure
that minimizes the average path length given the minimal number of links.
Given that the star is the only eﬃcient network for intermediate costs of links, we
might expect to see some conﬂict between stability of a network andeﬃciency. In a
star network in the connections model, the center player bears a great deal of cost
and provides a great deal of externalities for other players, but is not compensated for
those externalities. Thus there will be whole ranges of costs of links, where the eﬃcient
networks are not pairwise stable. The description of pairwise stable networks in the
symmetric connections model, from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), is as follows.
32Proposition 4 In the symmetric connections model :
(i) A pairwise stable network has at most one (non-empty) component.
(ii) For c<δ−δ2, the unique pairwise stable network is the the complete graph, gN.
(iii) For δ − δ2 <c<δ , a star encompassing all players is pairwise stable, but not
necessarily the unique pairwise stable graph.
(iv) For δ<c , any pairwise stable network which is nonempty is such that each player
has at least two links and thus is ineﬃcient.27
As we expected, for high and low costs to links, eﬃcient networks coincide with the
pairwise stable networks, andthe problematic case is for intermed iate costs to links.
For instance, consider a situation where n =4a n dδ<c<δ+ δ2
2 .H e r e a s t a r
network is the unique eﬃcient structure. However, the only pairwise stable network
is the empty network. To see this, note that since c>δan player gets a positive
payoﬀ from a link only if it also oﬀers an indirect connection. Thus, clearly the star
will not be pairwise stable as the center bears more cost for each link than it gets in
beneﬁts. Moreover, this implies that if a network is nonempty andstable then each
player must have at least two links, as if i has only one link andit is to j,t h e nj
wouldbeneﬁt from severing that link. We can also see in this cost range that an player
maintains at most 2 links, since the payoﬀ to an player with three links (given n =4 )
is less than 0 since c>δ . So, a pairwise stable network wouldhave to be a ring (e.g.,
{12,23,34,14}). However, such a network is not pairwise stable since the payoﬀ to any
player is increasedby severing a link. For instance, 1’s payoﬀ in the ring is 2 δ+δ2−2c,
while severing the link 14 leads to δ + δ2 + δ3 − c which is higher since c>δ .
Although the empty network is the unique pairwise stable network, it is not even
Pareto eﬃcient. The empty network is Pareto dominated by a line (e.g., g = {12,23,34}).
To see this, not that und er the line, the payoﬀ to the endplayers (1 and4) is δ+δ2+δ3−c
which is greater than 0, and to the middle two players (2 and 3) the payoﬀ is 2δ+δ2−2c
which is also greater than 0 since c<δ+ δ2
2 .
Thus, there exist cost ranges under the symmetric connections model for which
all pairwise stable networks are Pareto ineﬃcient, andother cost ranges where all
pairwise stable networks are eﬃcient. There are also some cost ranges where some
27If δ +
(N−2)
2 δ2 >c , then all pairwise stable networks are ineﬃcient since then the empty graph is
also ineﬃcient.
33pairwise stable networks are eﬃcient andsome other pairwise stable networks are not
even Pareto eﬃcient.
Even when there are some eﬃcient networks that are pairwise stable in the symmet-
ric connections model, they might not be reached. For instance, Watts (1997) shows
that as n increases, the probability that the resulting stable state is a star goes to 0.
Thus as the population increases the particular ordering which is needed to form a star
(the eﬃcient network) becomes less and less likely relative to orderings leading to some
other stable states. Watts’ (1997) result is statedas follows.
Proposition 5 Consider the symmetric connections model in the case where δ−δ2 <
c<δ . As the number of players grows, the probability that a stable state (under the
process where each link has an equal probability of being identiﬁed) is reached with the
eﬃcient network structure of a star goes to 0.
The above propositions show us that there may be cases where the networks that
are pairwise stable (or stable states) are not eﬃcient, nor even Pareto eﬃcient.
At this point there is a series of important questions that come up.
We begin to see from the connections model that some reallocation of value might
be natural, andmight help reconcile eﬃciency andstability. For instance, the center
of the star couldnegotiate with the other players to receive some payments or favors
for maintaining her links with the other players.28 If we start to account for such
reallocations can we reconcile eﬃciency andstability?
As there are many diﬀerent ways in which we might think of these issues, let us list
some of the questions along these lines come to mind.
(1) If we can control the allocation rule, can we always design an allocation rule such
that at least one eﬃcient network is pairwise stable?
(2) Can we always design an allocation rule such that at least one eﬃcient network
is pairwise stable if we impose some minimal conditions on the allocation rule
such as anonymity andcomponent balance?
(3) If the answer to (2) is no, what if we weaken the demands on eﬃciency, or on
anonymity or on component balance?
28In fact, intuition from the sociology literature would suggest that an player in such a central
position should receive a high payoﬀ (e.g., see Burt (1992)).
34(4) If the answer to (2) is no, is there some nice class of situations where we can
design an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule such that at least
one eﬃcient network is pairwise stable?
(5) For given allocation rules, what are the classes of value functions for when it is
that eﬃcient andstable networks coincid e?
(6) What can we say about these questions for alternative stability notions?
(7) Will eﬃcient networks be formedif bargaining over the allocation andthe network
formation are tiedtogether?
The answer to question (1) (whether we can design an allocation rule that reconciles
eﬃciency andstability) is yes, andit is easy to see. Consid er the egalitarian allocation
rule, Y e. This completely aligns player incentives andoverall eﬃciency as players’
payoﬀs are directly proportional to overall network value. Thus, under the egalitarian
allocation rule every eﬃcient network is pairwise stable, andin fact strongly stable.
While this is partly reassuring, it turns out that this answer is really dependent on
such a full reallocation of value. A fully egalitarian rule has nice incentive properties,
but it is an extreme rule andin particular requires that value be allocatedacross
diﬀerent components. That is, the egalitarian rule fails to satisfy component balance.
In the long run this might be problematic, as some components will be receiving less
than their value andmight beneﬁt from seced ing.
This takes us to question (2) - as to whether or not we can ﬁndan allocation rule
for which eﬃciency andstability are reconciled , while at the same time satisfying some
simple conditions such as component balance and anonymity. The following proposition
shows that there is no component balancedandanonymous allocation rule for which
it is always the case that some eﬃcient network is pairwise stable. Thus, the answer
to (2) is no. This proposition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).29
Proposition 6 There does not exist any component balanced and anonymous alloca-
tion rule such that for every v there exists an eﬃcient network that is pairwise stable.
29Jackson (2003) shows that the proposition can be strengthened to only require equal treatment
of equals rather than anonymity, and that it also holds if eﬃciency of the network is replaced by
constrained eﬃciency. Arguably, if one is requiring component balance of the allocation rule, then the
eﬃciency notion should be similarly deﬁned and so constrained eﬃciency is the appropriate notion.
See Jackson (2003) for details.
35The proof of Proposition 6 shows that there is a particular v such that for every
component balancedandanonymous allocation rule none of the constrainedeﬃcient
networks are pairwise stable.
To see the proof, simply consider the following example with n = 3 players. Here v
is such that any one-link network has a value of 1, any two-link network has a value of



















































So, in this example the eﬃcient network structure is a two-link network. Now let
us consider what allocations have to be. By anonymity and component balance, the
allocations in one-link and three-link networks are completely determined. Each player
connectedin a one-link network gets an allocation of 1
2.E a c hp l a y e ri nt h ec o m p l e t e
network gets an allocation of 1
3. Let us consider what the possibilities are for a two-
link network, with the idea that we would like to make the two-link network pairwise
stable. In order for a two-link network to be pairwise stable it must be that the middle
player (who has two links) gets an allocation of at least 1
2 or else he wouldbeneﬁt from
severing one of the links. Also, for a two-link network to be pairwise stable the other
two players must each get an allocation of at least 1
3 or else they wouldbeneﬁt from




12, andso this is not feasible.
Thus, there is no possible allocation rule satisfying anonymity andcomponent balance
such that the eﬃcient network is pairwise stable here.
The answer to question (3) is that the conditions of anonymity and component
balance do play important roles in the incompatibility of stability and eﬃciency. If we
drop either of the conditions then we can reconcile eﬃciency and stability. That is,
Proposition 6 is tight.
36Let us examine each aspect of the proposition. If we drop component balance,
then as mentionedbefore the egalitarian allocation rule will always have all eﬃcient
networks being (strongly) stable.
If we drop anonymity (or equal treatment of equals), then a careful and clever
construction of Y by Dutta andMutuswami (1997) ensures that some eﬃcient network
is strongly stable for a class of v. This is statedin the following proposition.
Let V∗ = {v ∈V|g  = ∅⇒v(g) > 0}. This is a class of value functions where any
network generates a positive value.
The following proposition is due to Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).
Proposition 7 There exists a component balanced Y such that for any v ∈V ∗,s o m e
eﬃcient network is pairwise stable. Moreover, while Y is not anonymous, it is still
anonymous on some networks that are both eﬃcient and pairwise stable. 30
This proposition shows that if one can design an allocation rule, and only wishes
to satisfy anonymity on stable networks, then eﬃciency andstability are compatible.
Next, let us consider the question of requiring the allocation rule to be component
balancedandanonymous, but weakening eﬃciency to only require Pareto eﬃciency. If
we do this, then the component-wise egalitarian rule ensures that for any value func-
tion at least one pairwise stable network is Pareto eﬃcient, as statedin the following
proposition.
Let g(v,S) = argmaxg∈gS
v(g)
#N(g) denote the network with the highest per capita
value out of those that can be formedby players in S ⊂ N.
Given a component additive v,ﬁ n dan e t w o r kgv through the following algorithm.
Pick some h1 ∈ g(v,N) with a maximal number of links out of those in the set. Next,
pick some h2 ∈ g(v,N \ N(h1)) with a maximal number of links out of those in the
set. Iteratively, at stage k pick a new component hk ∈ g(v,N \ N(∪i≤k−1hi)) with a
maximal number of links. Once there are only empty networks left stop. The union of
the components pickedin this way d eﬁnes a network gv.
The following proposition is a variation on one due to Banerjee (1999).31
30Dutta and Mutuswami work with a variation of strong stability. As mentioned before, their version
of strong stability is not quite a strengthening of pairwise stability, as it only considers one network
to defeat another if there is a deviation by a coalitions that makes all of its members strictly better
oﬀ; while pairwise stability allows one of the two players adding a link to be indiﬀerent. However, one
can check that the construction of Dutta and Mutuswami extends to pairwise stability as well.
31Banerjee (1999) actually works with a weighted version of the component-wise egalitarian rule,
37Proposition 8 Under a component additive v,agv deﬁned by the above algorithm
is a pairwise stable and Pareto eﬃcient network under the component-wise egalitarian
rule.
While this proposition is of some interest, given that we are allowing reallocation of
value, it’s not clear that Pareto eﬃciency is the right notion of eﬃciency. In particular,
constrainedeﬃciency seems to be more appropriate, andthen the proposition no longer
is true, as we have seen already in Proposition 6 (and its footnote).
So, reconciling the tension between stability andeﬃciency will require giving some-
thing up in terms of our desired conditions of anonymity, component balance, and
eﬃciency; andso to some extent this tension is a characteristic of network games.
This leads us to another one of our questions (4): is there some nice class of
situations where we can d esign an anonymous andcomponent balancedallocation rule
such that at least one eﬃcient network is pairwise stable? That is, the tension arises
for some value functions, but not all. What do we know about the structure of value
functions for which there is (or is not) a tension?
The following proposition provides a partial answer to (4) by identifying a very
particular feature of the tension between eﬃciency andstability. It shows that in
situations where eﬃcient networks are such that each player has at least two links,
then there is no tension. So, problems arise only in situations where eﬃcient networks
involve players who may be thought of as “loose ends.”
An e t w o r kg has no loose ends if for any i ∈ N(g), #{j|ij ∈ g}≥2.
The following proposition is due to Jackson (2003).
Proposition 9 There exists an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule
such that if v is anonymous and has an eﬃcient network with no loose ends, then there
is at least one eﬃcient network (with no loose ends) that is pairwise stable.
The proof of proposition 9 is constructive, showing that a variation on the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule works. This tells us that the tension between eﬃciency
which is a straightforward generalization of this result. Also, he works with a notion of strong stability,
but one that only accounts for deviations that make all players strictly better oﬀ. Note that gv will
not always be strongly stable under the deﬁnition here. Finally, the algorithm here is a bit diﬀerent
from his, as I require the maximal number of links in the deﬁnition of each hk, and this is critical
to guaranteeing pairwise stability. Banerjee does not have to worry about this since his deﬁnition of
stability only considers deviations where all deviating players are strictly better oﬀ.
38andstability has some natural limits, andmust involve situations where eﬃcient net-
works has some players who have single links.
The analysis in the last few propositions took a “design” perspective, in that the
question was askedas to whether there existedany allocation rule that wouldreconcile
eﬃciency andstability. More generally, however, the allocation rule might be d eter-
minednaturally by the environment. To the extent that we cannot intervene (or prefer
not to unless needed), it is important to know when there will be a tension between
eﬃciency andstability for a given allocation rule.
The diﬃculty in addressing this issue is that the space of allocation rules is quite
large andso provid ing a characterization of when there are tensions andwhen not,
is an overwhelming task. What we might do, is instead simply look at some natural
allocation rules andnatural settings. Many of the examples from 3 are ones for which
this is the approach that has been taken. There a setting, value function, andallocation
rule are given by the mod el, andthen one analyzes which networks are stable andcan
address the issue of whether they are eﬃcient. This is a valuable exercise, and provides
some insights. The results, however, are particular to the models in question. Given
the limits on the length of this survey, I will not go over those results here.32
In order to get a bit broader view, we can look at question (5): For given allocation
rules, what are the classes of value functions for when it is that eﬃcient andstable
networks coincide?
A natural starting point for this question is to work with the most obvious of
component balancedandanonymous allocation rules, the component-wise egalitarian
rule. A strong reason for doing this is that we know the egalitarian rule has very nice
incentive properties, andso the component-wise version wouldseem to be a nice one
to work with under the constraint of component balance. The following proposition
provides a characterization of when the component-wise egalitarian rule works well.
A link ij is critical to the graph g if g − ij has more components than g or if i is
only linkedto j under g.
A critical link is one such that if it is severed, then the component that it was a
part of will become two components (or one of the nodes will become disconnected).
Let h denote a component which contains a critical link and let h1 and h2 denote the
components obtainedfrom h by severing that link (where it may be that h1 = ∅ or
32The reader is referred to the papers themselves. The reader can also ﬁnd some comparison across
some of the bargaining models in Jackson (2003).
39h2 = ∅).
The pair (g,v) satisﬁes critical link monotonicity if, for any critical link in g andits
associatedcomponents h, h1,a n dh2,w eh a v et h a tv(h) ≥ v(h1)+v(h2) implies that
v(h)/#N(h) ≥ max[v(h1)/#N(h1),v(h2)/#N(h2)].
The following proposition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
Proposition 10 If g is eﬃcient relative to a component additive v,t h e ng is pairwise
stable for Y ce relative to v if and only if (g,v) satisﬁes critical link monotonicity.
Question (6) asks about the relationship between eﬃciency andstability for for-
mation models other than pairwise stability. Short of the consideration of bargaining
together with network formation (question (7)), the only analysis has been in terms of
strong stability.33 Note that strong stability goes a long way towards guaranteeing at
least Pareto eﬃciency simply by deﬁnition, and so it will not be too surprising that the
issue will largely boil down to existence of strongly stable networks. It also turns out
that an interesting implication of strong stability is that if we have an eﬃcient network
being strongly stable, then the allocation we are working with must be the component-
wise egalitarian rule, at least on the given network. This makes the component-wise
egalitarian rule a natural one to focus on. These ideas are formalized as follows.
Let Π(g) denote the partition of N induced by the network g.34
An allocation rule Y is component decomposable if Yi(g,v)=Yi(g|S,v) for each
component additive v, g ∈ G, S ∈ Π(g), and i ∈ S.
Component decomposability requires that in situations where v is component ad-
ditive, the way in which value is allocated within a component does not depend on
the structure of other components. So, in situations where there are no externalities
across components, the allocation within a component is independent of the rest of the
network.
The following proposition is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2000).
Proposition 11 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function
v ∈ V .I f Y is an anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced
allocation rule and g ∈ G with Π(g)  = {N} is a network that is strongly stable with
respect to Y and v,t h e nY (g,v)=Y ce(g,v) and Yi(g,v)=
v(g)
n for each i ∈ N.
33There is analysis of other formation models in the context of directed networks. One can ﬁnd
some discussion of that in the chapter by Goyal (2002).
34That is, S ∈ Π(g), if and only if either there exists h ∈ C(g) such that S = N(h), or there exists
i/ ∈ N(g) such that S = {i}.
40While Proposition 11 only ties down the allocation rule on strongly stable networks,
it still strongly suggests the component-wise egalitarian rule as a focal one. So let us
examine when eﬃcient networks are strongly stable under that allocation rule.
A value function v is top convex if some eﬃcient network also maximizes the per-
capita value among players.35 That is, the value function v is top convex if there exists




#N(g ) for all g .
Top convexity implies that all components of an eﬃcient network must leadto the
same per-capita value. If some component ledto a lower per capita value than the
average, then another component wouldhave to leadto a higher per capita value than
the average which wouldcontrad ict top convexity.
Jackson andvan d en Nouweland(2001) prove the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v.
The set of eﬃcient networks coincides with the set of strongly stable networks under
the component-wise egalitarian rule if and only if v is top convex. Moreover, the set of
strongly stable networks is nonempty under the component-wise egalitarian rule if and
only if v is top convex.
To get some feeling for the top-convexity condition, note that in the symmetric
connections model v is top convex for all values of δ ∈ [0,1) and c ≥ 0, so that all
networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y ce and v are eﬃcient with respect
to v. This means that top-convexity is a condition that is satisﬁed in some natural
situations. However, it is still a demanding condition that has strong implications.
Simultaneous Network Formation and Allocation of Value
Finally, let us turn to question (7) regarding what happens when the allocation of
value andthe formation of the network occur as part of the same bargaining process.
Currarini andMorelli (2000) show that for a wid e class of value functions, all
subgame perfect equilibria of their formation game are eﬃcient. As it applies for a
fairly broadclass of value functions, it shows that und er some assumptions the tension
between stability andeﬃciency may be overcome if bargaining over value is tiedto link
formation.
A value function v satisﬁes size monotonicity if v(g) >v (g − ij) for every g and
critical link ij ∈ g.
35A related condition is called “domination by the grand coalition,” as deﬁned in the context of a
cooperative game by Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993).
41While this also a demanding condition, it is one that is often satisﬁed in situations
where large networks are eﬃcient. The demanding aspect is the requirement that it
holdfor all g, andit is not clear the extent to which that is vital to the following result.
The following proposition is due to Currarini and Morelli (2000).
Proposition 13 If v satisﬁes size monotonicity, then every (subgame perfect) equi-
librium of the Currarini and Morelli bargaining and network formation game leads to
an eﬃcient network.
Mutuswami andWinter (2000) also d iscuss a similar network formation game and
show that such positive results holdfor even more general value functions, und er a
slightly diﬀerent formulation. In their analysis, players receive increasing beneﬁts in
the size of the network andincur increasing costs. The game is such that insteadof
making demands on how much value they desire, players indicate how much they will
contribute towards the cost of links. Moreover, Mutuswami and Winter show that a
variation on the game results in payoﬀs that mirror the Shapley value calculations of
a relatedcooperative game.
One aspect of these results deserves discussion. The ﬁnite ending point of the
game provides for strong bargaining power for early players in the sequence. They
essentially demand what can maximally be extracted given what the other players will
endup getting from the subsequent game. The maximum value comes from the eﬃcient
network, as the game really boils down to a bargaining one. It is not so clear what
wouldhappen if the bargaining protocol went on in some way, either with d iscounting
or with players being able to revise demands and actions. Proposition 13 is still very
important in pointing out the potential role of simultaneous formation of links and
bargaining over value, but whether this will turn out to be robust to variations in the
protocol is not yet clear.
6 The Myerson Value and alternative Allocation
Rules
In addition to the literature that has concentrated on questions of whether or not
eﬃcient networks are formed, there is also a literature that has looked in detail at
the axiomatic foundations of some allocation rules. To some extent, the axiomatic
treatment of allocation rules is the “cooperative” counter-part to the “non-cooperative”
42analysis of the stability of networks. The axiomatic literature largely grew out of
the cooperative game theory literature andmostly followedcooperative games with
communication or cooperation structures. However, almost all of the studies there
have fairly easy extensions to the more general network game setting.
Much of the literature on cooperative games with communication structures is
discussed in the chapter by van den Nouweland (2003), and so here I only brieﬂy
discuss here a small part of that axiomatic literature. In particular I discuss a part
that is closely related to the idea that networks are not ﬁxed, but something that is
subject to the discretion of the players involved; which is the part that is most closely
linkedto id eas of network formation.
In order to discuss these issues, let us ﬁrst observe a characterization of the Myerson
Value allocation rule, which is the most prominent allocation rule.
Equal Bargaining Power and the Myerson Value
An allocation rule satisﬁes equal bargaining power if for any component additive v
and g ∈ G
Yi(g) − Yi(g − ij)=Yj(g) − Yj(g − ij).
Note that equal bargaining power does not require that players split the marginal
value of a link. It just requires that they equally beneﬁt or suﬀer from its addition.
It is possible (andgenerally the case) that Yi(g) − Yi(g − ij)+Yj(g) − Yj(g − ij)  =
v(g) − v(g − ij).
The following proposition from Jackson andWolinsky (1996) is a fairly d irect ex-
tension of Myerson’s (1977) result from the setting of cooperative games with commu-
nication structures to the network game setting.
Proposition 14 Y satisﬁes component balance and equal bargaining power if and
only if Y (g,v)=Y MV(g,v) for all g ∈ G and any component additive v.
Dutta andMutuswami (1997) extendthe characterization to allow for weighted
bargaining power, andshow that one obtains a version of a weightedShapley (Myerson)
value.
While the Myerson value is an interesting allocation rule, the perspective it takes is
problematic from a network formation perspective. The basic problem with it is that
the value of other possible networks is not properly accountedfor in its calculations.
This is especially bothersome in situations where the network is something that can be
changed or is being formed. The basic idea is as follows. If the network is something
43that can be changed, or is such that alternative possible network structures are taken
into account when bargaining over how to allocate value, then values of alternative net-
works, and not just sub-networks, shouldbe important in d etermining the allocation.
If the network is completely ﬁxedandcannot be changed , then it is not clear why the
value of sub-networks (andonly sub-networks) shouldenter allocation calculations.
These criticisms can be made more precise by looking at some very simple examples.
Example 13 A Criticism of the Myerson Value
Consider a value function v where v({12})=v({23})=1 ,v({12,23}) = 1, and




































































Consider another value function v  deﬁned by v (g) = 1 for all g  = ∅. That is, under


















































































The Myerson Value allocation rule provides the same allocation on the network
{12,23}, regardless of whether the value function is v or v . In particular, player 2
gets a bigger allocation in the network {12,23} than the other players. This reﬂects
player 2’s status in two links in the network, andcomes about through the Shapley
value style calculations underlying the Myerson value, where we can think of building
up the network {12,23} by adding players one at a time.
While player 2’s position is special in the network {12,23}, player 2’s status is not
at all special if the value function is v . That is, any player couldhave equally well
servedthat central position. In fact, any non-empty network wouldprovid e the same
v a l u ea st h en e t w o r k{12,23}. To the extent that the network is something that can
be altered, there is no reason that player 2 should enjoy special treatment under v ,
andone might argue that all players shouldreceive equal payments.
To see some of the issues in more detail, one can look at the conditions that char-
acterize the Myerson value.
Example 14 A Criticism of the Equal Bargaining Power
45Next, let v({12})=v({23})=1a n dv(g) = 0 for all other networks. Here any
single link network that involves player 2 will generate a value of 1, while all other
networks generate a value of 0.
Any allocation rule, including the Myerson value, that satisﬁes equal bargaining
power (andallocates 0 to the players on the empty network) will have Y1({12},v)=
Y2({12},v).



























Here, there is a real asymmetry among the players andplayer 2 is more a critical
player than the others. It is not at all clear why we shouldrequire that the allocation
to players 1 and2 be the same in the network {12}, as player 2 has a viable outside
option while player 1 does not.36
There are other criticisms that can be made, including pointing out problems with
component balance. In response to these criticisms, Jackson (2003b) proposes the
following allocation rule. First an auxiliary deﬁnition is needed.
Given a value function v,i t smonotonic cover  v is deﬁned by




The monotonic cover of a value function looks at the highest value that can be
achievedby build ing a network out of a given set of links. The monotonic cover
captures the perspective that the network is ﬂexible, andso can be reorganizedto
produce the highest possible value.
Using this perspective leads to a natural adaptation of the Shapley value to network
games which results in the following allocation rule, which Jackson calledthe Player-
BasedFlexible Network Allocation Rule. 37
36For instance, if one brings in Core-based considerations, then in fact the full value should be given
to player 2 in this example.
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This allocation rule looks at the value that any group of players S couldgenerate by
forming the best possible network they could. Then through Shapley-style calculations,
it looks at the marginal value generated by adding an player to diﬀerent groups, and
then the allocation is in proportion to these marginal contributions.
On a superﬁcial level this rule bears some similarities to the Myerson Value because
we see Shapley Value style calculations. However, it is a quite diﬀerent allocation
rule. In fact, it violates both equal bargaining power andcomponent balance, and
is characterizedby cond itions that are violatedby the Myerson value. For instance,
looking back at Example 13, Y PBFN provides allocations that diﬀer on v and v .I n
fact, it agrees with the Myerson Value under v andin contrast is fully egalitarian und er
v . In Example 14 it provides higher allocations to player 2 than the others, again in
contrast to the Myerson value.
More generally, once one takes this perspective that alternative network structures
shouldmatter in d etermining an allocation, a variety of cooperative game theoretic
solutions concepts, including, for example, the Nucleolus, can be called upon in addition
to the Shapley value. The simple idea is that the monotonic cover  v,c a nb eu s e d




The survey here has focussedon the case of non-d irectednetworks. More speciﬁ-
cally, the important aspect here is the treatment of situations where a link between two
players requires the consent of both parties. While this non-directed or mutual consent
“link-based”. For more on the idea of allocating value based on links rather than players see Meeson
(1988) and Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992). The idea is instead to apply the value to links rather than
players, and then to assign the value to players based on the links that they control. Other variations
involve using other solution concepts such as the Nucleolus.
38See Jackson (2003b) for details.
47case covers many (if not most) situations of interest, the case where links are directed
andmay be formedunilaterally also includ es some important settings. For instance, a
web site can provide a link or pointer to another web site without the second web site’s
permission. Likewise if we consider a network of researchers and examine who cites
whom, this is another network that is both directed and where links can be formed
unilaterally, as one researcher can generally cite another researcher without the second
researcher’s permission.
While the analysis of directed networks is diﬀerent from that of non-directed net-
works, the overall themes end up being similar. The main diﬀerences are in modeling
network formation, which is simpler due to the unilateral action, and of course in the
applications covered. In particular, there still exists a tension between stability and
eﬃciency (see Dutta andJackson (2000)), and , again, there situations where eﬃcient
networks self-organize quite naturally. For instance, Bala andGoyal (2000a) consid er a
d irectedversion of the connections mod el, andﬁndthat in situations where the d ecay
is not too high (δ is close to 1) eﬃcient networks are the unique strict Nash equilibrium
networks in a directed variation of Myerson’s (1990) network formation game. This is
discussed in more detail in the chapter by Goyal (2002), and so I will not say more
here.
Closing Remarks
The literature surveyedhere helps us to und erstandnetwork formation. As networks
are pervasive in social andeconomic interactions, this literature was really inevitable.
As we have seen, there are interesting andsomewhat unexpectedrelationships between
which networks are eﬃcient from society’s perspective andwhich networks form as the
result of player incentives. Another thing that we have learnedis that explicit mod eling
of networks is tractable, and that a valuable theory can be developed.
While the literature has made some progress, there is still good news for researchers.
Namely, there are many important andinteresting open questions in this area that are
manageable andjust waiting for attention. Some of these questions involve theoretical
modeling, such as developing further understanding of the relationship between stable
andeﬃcient networks andhow this d epend s on the setting, andfurther exploring the
simultaneous bargaining over the allocation of value andthe formation of networks,
and more generally understanding how side payments might aﬀect network formation.
But these questions also go well beyondthe theoretical, to includ e the empirical and
experimental analysis of models of economic networks. I have not really touched upon
these here, partly because those areas are so wide open. Some folks are pioneering into
48these areas, as we see on the experimental side in Corbae and Duﬀy (2000), Charness,
Corominas-Bosch, andFrechette (2001), andCalland er andPlott (2002), andFalk and
Kosfeld(2003). 39 Work on the empirical side has a longer tradition dating back to early
studies on contact networks in labor economics (e.g., Rees (1966)), but is enjoying new
interest as in in recent work by Topa (2000), Fafchamps andLund(2000), andAizer
andCurrie (2002).
There are also some substantial challenges for the future literature on networks that
is coming out of economics andgame theory. One challenge is brid ging to the sociology
(“social networks”) literature.40 That literature is well-established, very large, and full
of interesting questions, insights, data sets, and knowledge of network structure and
what inﬂuences it. The main challenge comes in the diﬀerences in terminology, the
points of view, andthe techniques of analysis. As the literatures continue to grow, the
cross fertilization which is just beginning now shouldbecome more andmore natural.
39I should be careful to say that the experimental research on exchange networks from the socio-
logical side is quite extensive (e.g., see Bienenstock and Bonacich (1993)), as is the empirical analysis
of various network structures (e.g., see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and the references therein). So,
here I am referring more to the questions of network formation and the testing of formal models of
formation, as well as analyses of the eﬃciency of observed networks.
40To a more limited extent, the same can be said for bridging to the agent-based computation
models, where many network situations have be analyzed. There is more natural overlap there, as the
underlying view of players’ incentives and the terminology are closer to begin with.
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